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Razon: Environmental Law

COMMENT
WHAT IS GOOD FOR THE MARKET,
CAN BE BAD FOR THE HEALTH:
EMISSIONS TRADING UNDER
SCAQMD'S RULE 1610 AND THE
UNJUST ENVIRONMENTAL
EFFECTS

I.

INTRODUCTION

In his February 11, 1994 Executive Order, "Federal Action
to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and
Low-Income Populations," President William Jefferson Clinton
demonstrated his commitment to environmental justice. 1 This
Order commanded that all federal agencies factor environmental justice into their long term goals. 2 The 1994 Order,
which specifically seeks to combat environmental racism, is the
federal government's response to the environmental justice

1. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (Feb. 11, 1994), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 4321 (West 1998). "[Elach Federal agency shall make achieving environmental
justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing ... disproportionately high and
adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities
on minority population and low-income populations in the United States ... ." [d. §
4321.
2. See id.
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movement, an outgrowth of the civil rights and broader environmental movements that developed in the 1960s and 1970s. 3
While environmental racism is not a new phenomenon, only
recently has it been addressed as a separate issue within environmentallaw. 4 Rather than focusing solely on environmental
issues, such as global warming or the rainforests, environmental justice advocates focus specifically on the clisproportionate impact of environmental hazards on minorities. 5
While civil rights activists struggled to fmd their role in the
environmental justice movement, activists in the larger environmental community have also been in conflict over their role.
Traditional environmentalists have relied on "rules and orders
to control pollution, toxic wastes [and] chemical hazards."6
Currently, the states and the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) are moving toward market-based incentive systems. Proponents of the market-based incentive system claim
these programs give industry greater flexibility and achieve
environmental protection less expensively without violating
federal standards. Rather than proscribing the means by
which sources are to meet their pollution control requirements,

3. See Omar Saleem, Overcoming Environmental Discrimination: The Need For
A Disparate Impact Test and Improved Notice Requirements In Facility Siting
Decisions, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 211, 216 (1994) (quoting Robert Bullard, The Threat
of Environmental Racism, 7 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 23 (1993)). Environmental
racism is defmed as "any policy, practice, or directive ... that differentially affects or
disadvantages (whether intended or unintended) individuals, groups, or communities
based on race or color [as well as) exclusionary and restrictive practices that limit
participation by people of color in decision·making boards, commissions, and regulating
bodies." Id.
4. See Alice Kaswan, Article, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between
Environmental Laws and "Justice", 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 225 (1997) (discusses a plan
for uniting environmental goals with social justice goals). See also infra notes 10·32
and accompanying text for discussion of the origins of the environmental justice
movement.
5. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1440 (Merriam·Webster,
Inc. 1986). The term "minority" or "minority group" is defmed as "a group differing
from the predominant section of a larger group in one or more characteristics (as ethnic
background ... ) and as a result often subjected to differential treatment and esp[cially)
discrimination." Id.
6. See generally Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through
Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153 (1988) (discusses the transformation
from the command and control system to the market·based incentive programs).
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market-based incentive systems often allow polluters to buy
and sell pollution like a commodity. For example, the Los Angeles area, noted for having the most polluted air in the country, has set the standard for market-based incentive systems
through its Regional Clean Air Incentives Market program.
The current debate in environmental circles pits these marketbased incentive programs, deemed more efficient by industry,
against the traditional command and control system.
In Section II, this Comment examines the development of
both the environmental justice movement and the traditional
environmental movement. Section II also describes the South
Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) and its application of a market-based incentive program known as "emissions trading." This section explains SCAQMD's Old-Vehicle
Scrapping Rule 1610 (Rule 1610) and Rule 1610's failure to address environmental justice issues. Section III examines the
disparate effects of the program on minority communities. Section IV critiques the way in which oil companies were permitted to use Rule 1610 and how their use resulted in such disparate effects. Finally, Section V proposes that emissions trades
be more closely monitored and that environmental justice be
the primary factor in the environmental regulation decisionmaking processes.
II.

BACKGROUND

The environmental justice movement grew out of many civil
rights activists' awareness that minority and low-income communities were consistently burdened with toxic environments. 7
During the same time period in which the environmental justice movement was formed, environmental law as a whole began to experiment with market-based incentive programs in-

7. See United Church of Christ Commission For Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes and
Race in the United States: A National Report on the Racial and Socio-Economic
Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites (1987). The Commission
for Racial Justice is the racial agency of the United Church of Christ which fights for
the rights of African American and other racial minorities. See id at ix. The study
reports that "lbllacks are disproportionately burdened by environmental problems
because they are more likely to hold industrial jobs where chemical processing or
manufacturing poses health risks." Id. at 2.
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stead of following the traditional command and control system.
After numerous complaints from industry regarding the command and control system, federal and state environmental
agencies created newer, more flexible standards. 8 This transformation to a market-based environmental protection scheme
allowed industry more control in implementing pollution prevention and in decreasing their economic burdens. 9 However, it
has been minorities and low-income people who have remained
overburdened with toxic hazards and whom environmental justice advocates have sought to protect under the existing civil
rights laws.
A.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT'S ORIGINS

In the late 1960s, as the civil rights movement continued to
break down many of the racial barriers previously restricting
Mrican Americans and other minorities from equal access to
employment and educational opportunities, the environmental
justice movement developed.lO In 1967, an eight year old African American girl drowned at a garbage dump next to an elementary school and city park in a predominantly African
American neighborhood. 11 The girl's drowning triggered riots
among the Mrican American students at Texas Southern University.12 These riots demonstrated an early awareness by civil
rights activists of environmental justice issues. 13

8. See generally Stewart, supra note 6 (explains the conflicts between the
command and control and the market-based incentive systems).
9. See id.
10. See Kaswan, supra note 4, at 221 (discusses the emergence of the
environmental justice movement).
11. See Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice For All: It's the Right Thing To
Do, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 281, 284 (1994) (quoting ROBERT D. BULLARD, INVISIBLE
HOUSTON: THE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN BOOM AND BUST 110 (1987». The author
provides the reader with what he believes are the defining events that led to the
creation of the movement. He cites the events subsequent to an Mrican American girl
drowning in a Houston, Texas dumpsite; the siting of a PCB landfill in a minority
neighborhood in North Carolina; and the 1991 First National People of Color
Environmental Leadership Summit. See id.
12. See id. at 284.
13. See id. at 285. The author discusses how Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. traveled
to Memphis, Tennessee on a mission to improve working conditions for African
American garbage workers. See id.
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While the civil rights movement focused primarily on
achieving equal opportunity and social status for Mrican
Americans and other minorities, the child's drowning near
Texas Southern University and the subsequent riots, as well as
other related activism, served to cement the existence of the
environmental justice movement. 14 Heightened awareness that
minority and low-income people continued to live in unsafe and
toxic environments, gave rise to the movement now known as
environmental justice. 15
The environmental justice movement progressed slowly
during the 1970s because many ardent civil rights activists distrusted the broader environmental movement. 16 In particular,
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) viewed environmental causes with suspicion because members believed that environmentalists negatively impacted minorities. 17 In 1978, the NAACP claimed thatenvironmental regulations hindered Mrican American socioeconomic progress because many environmental policies eliminated jobs primarily held by Mrican Americans. 18
Despite the initial activism of the 1960s, the slow progress
in the 1970s delayed the environmental justice movement's rise
to the national attention until 1982. At that time, citizens of
Afton, Warren County, North Carolina protested the state's
selection of their town as a Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB)
landfill site. 19 North Carolina officials chose the poorest part of
Warren County, which was eighty-five percent Mrican American, as the location to dump PCB-contaminated oil. 20

14. See id. at 285-287.
15. See id. at 285.
16. See generally Edward Flattau, Our Environment Column, GANNETI' NEWS
SERVICE, Nov. I, 1991, available in 1991 WL 5607311.
17. See ill. The article reports that "in 1978, the NAACP released a policy paper
denouncing energy conservation and anti-pollution regulations as barriers to blacks'
socio-economic progress." [d.
18. See ill.
19. See Bullard, supra note 11, at 281. The North Carolina protest represented
the first time environmental racism was recognized as different from other
environmental issues. See ill.
20. See ill. at 285.
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For the fIrst time, environmental and civil rights activists,
as well as labor and political leaders, joined together to oppose
North Carolina's decision to build the toxic landfill. 21 Despite
the protest, the state pursued the proposal. 22 The controversy
surrounding the siting, however, compelled an investigation.23
Outraged with North Carolina's site selection for the PCB landfill, the Chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus, Walter
Fauntroy, and New Jersey Congressional Representative
James J. Florio, requested that the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) investigate the correlation between the
siting of hazardous waste facilities and the racial and economic
makeup of the communities with hazardous waste sites. 24 In
its subsequent 1983 report, the GAO found that in Region IV,
comprised of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee, "black people
make up the m~ority of the population in three of the four
communities ... where hazardous waste landfills are sited."25
In addition, at least twenty-six percent of the population within
each of these four communities fell below the poverty level. 26
The protest to the Afton site and the GAO reMrt marked the

21. See id. In this instance the community specifically opposed North Carolina,
which marked the first time any state was challenged on environmental justice
grounds. Hence, this event has been attributed to the birth of the environmental
justice movement. See id.
22. See Andrew Holmes and Larry B. Cowart, Environmental Racism: The New
Liability for Industrial Site Selection, 21 AM. SOCIETY OF REAL ESTATE COUNSELORS,
REAL ESTATE ISSUES, 1 (1996). This article discusses how industrial siting decisions
complicate environmental justice issues since economic issues often come into conflict
with public health issues. See id.
23. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-83-168, Siting Of
Hazardous Waste Landfills And Their Correlation With Racial And Economic Status Of
Surrounding Communities (1983).
The ensuing investigation resulted in the
publication of this named report. See id. at 3.
24. See Majority of Landfills in EPA Region N Located in Black Communities,
GAO says, [Jan.-June) Env't Rep. (BNA) No.8, at 302 (June 24, 1983). Both men
already believed that there was a correlation between the siting of these landfills and
the racial and socio-economic makeup of the communities in which they were sited.
See id.
25. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOIRCED-83-168, Siting Of Hazardous
Waste Landfills And Their Correlation With Racial And Economic Status Of
Surrounding Communities (1983).
26. See id. at 1.
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beginning of environmental justice awareness that would continue and grow throughout the 1980s. 27
In 1987, the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial
Justice released its own report that found "three out of every
five black and Hispanic Americans live in a community with
uncontrolled toxic waste sites."28 In contrast to the GAO report, the United Church of Christ study concluded that race,
irrespective of socio-economic status, was the determinative
factor in the siting of environmental hazards. 29
Soon, other groups began to participate in the environmental justice struggle. In 1988, the Gulf Coast Tenants Association and Greenpeace led a march down Louisiana's notorious
"Cancer Alley," a polluted area of the Mississippi River which
extends from Baton Rouge to New Orleans. so These organizations were outraged by the dense concentration of accumulated
hazardous waste along the Mississippi River. 31 Although the

27. See Marcia Coyle, When Movements Coalesce; Empowerment; Civil Rights
Meets Environmental Rights, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S10. The article also refers
to the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice study and the march in
the polluted "Cancer Alley" portion of the Mississippi River. See id.
28. United Church of Christ Commission For Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes and
Race in the United States: A National &port on the Racial and Socio·Economic
Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites, 1987, at xiv. The report
defines uncontrolled toxic waste sites as "closed and abandoned sites on the EPA's list
of sites which pose a present and potential threat to human health and the
environment." [d. at xii.
29. See id. at xiii. The United Church of Christ For Racial Justice (UCC), along
with a New York-based research firm, Public Data Access, Inc., conducted studies that
examined "[t)he racial and socio-economic characteristics of Americans living in
residential areas surround [ed) [by) commercial hazardous waste facilities and
uncontrolled toxic waste sites throughout the United States." [d. at 9. After
conducting two "cross· sectional" studies, the UCC and Public Data Access, Inc.
concluded that race reoccurred as the predominant factor in decisions regarding the
siting of hazardous waste facilities. See id.
30. See Coyle, supra note 27, at S10. The author elaborates on other defining
events in the environmental justice movement. See id. See also Mary T. Schmich,
'Chemical Soup' of Mississippi River Worries &sidents, THE ORANGE COUNTY
REGISTER, Nov. 20,1988, at A12, available in 1988 WL 4417815. The article discusses
the "Cancer Alley" protests that occurred in the polluted Mississippi region and the
lack of real results. See id.
31. See Schmich, supra note 30, at A12. In this area ofthe Mississippi River, "the
catfish taste[d) oily, the river shrimp [had) vanished and, at night, acrid odors [drove)
people inside off their porches. [d. See also J. Michael Kennedy, Danger in Louisiana's
'Cancer Alley'l Druggist Questions Link Between Miscarriages, Plant Emissions on
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protestors did not get any concessions from the companies who
contributed to making Louisiana's rivers so heavily polluted,
Louisiana later made efforts to work with several of these companies and convinced them to install monitors on the pollution
discharge pipes that "run across River Road like bridlges to the
levee. n32
B.

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT IN THE

1990s

The 1987 United Church of Christ Commission For Racial
Justice report, together with additional overwhelming statistics documenting disproportionate amounts of industrial pollution in low-income and minority neighborhoods, served as a
wake-up call to minority communities. 33 In 1991, minority
group representatives from the United States, Canada, Latin
America and the Pacific Rim gathered in Washington, D.C. for
the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership
Summit to confront environmental justice issues. 34 At this conference, the participants adopted seventeen environmental justice principles to combat environmental racism. 35

River, LOS ANGELES TIMES, May 14, 1989, at I, available in 1989 WL 2738029. In
1987, according to data submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency from the
chemical industry, "774 million pounds of toxics were dumped into Louisiana's
waterways" and "another 134 million pounds oftoxics were released into the air." [d.
32. Schmich, supra note 30, at A12. Interestingly, the city charged the protestors
with violating the $740 parade-permit fee requirement, but the article suggested that
the city used this rule as a pretext for its disapproval of the protestors' message. See
id. Some of the past plants located in this area were "petrochemical giants" such as
Shell, Dow, Exxon, Occidental, Du Pont and Union Carbide. See id.
33. See Flattau, supra note 16.
34. See Principles of Environmental Justice, Proceedings of the First National
People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, xiii (1991) (on file with author).
35. See id. The seventeen principles are as follows:
1) Environmental justice affirms the sacredness of Mother Earth, ecological
unity and the interdependence of all species, and the right to be free from
ecological destruction. 2) Environmental justice demands that public policy be
based on mutual respect and justice for all peoples, free from any form of
discrimination or bias. 3) Environmental justice mandates the right to ethical,
balanced and responsible uses of land and renewable resources in the interest
of a sustainable planet for humans and other living things. 4) Environmental
justice calls for universal protection from the extraction, production and
disposal of toxicJhazardous wastes and poisons and nuclear testing that
threaten the fundamental right to clean air, land, water and food. 5)
Environmental justice affirms the fundamental right to political, economic,
cultural and environmental self-determination of all peoples.
6)
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The summit's theme became "our health is not negotiable"
which marked a departure from previous NAACP claims that
the environmental movement stunted the socio-economic
growth of the African American community.36
Since the summit, however, not only do minority communities continue to suffer from the disproportionate effects of toxic
environments, but their communities are also the last areas to
have their toxic sites cleaned. 37 White communities with haz-

Environmental justice demands the cessation of the production of all toxins,
hazardous wastes and radioactive materials, and that all past and current
producers be held strictly accountable to the people for detoxification and the
containment at the point of production. 7) Environmental justice demands the
right to participate as equal partners at every level of decision making
including needs assessment, planning, implementation, enforcement and
evaluation. 8) Environmental justice affirms the right of all workers to a safe
and healthy work environment, without being forced to choose between an
unsafe livelihood and unemployment. It also aflirms the right of those who
work at home to be free from environmental hazards. 9) Environmental
justice protects the right of victims of environmental injustice to receive full
compensation and reparations for damages as well as quality health care. 10)
Environmental justice considers governmental acts of environmental injustice
a violation of international law, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
and the United Nations Convention on Genocide. 11) Environmental Justice
must recognize a special legal and natural relationship of Native Peoples to
the US government through treaties, agreements, compacts and covenants
which impose upon the US government a paramount obligation and
responsibility to affirm the sovereignty and self-determination of the
indigenous peoples whose lands it occupies and holds in trust.
12)
Environmental justice affirms the need for urban and rural ecological policies
to clean-up and rebuild our cities and rural areas in balance with nature,
honoring the cultural integrity of all our communities, and providing fair
access for all to the full range of resources. 13) Environmental justice calls for
the strict enforcement of principles of informed consent, and a halt to the
testing of experimental reproductive and medical procedures and vaccinations
on people of color. 14) Environmental justice opposes the destructive
operations of multinational corporations. 15) Environmental justice opposes
military occupation, repression and exploitation of lands, peoples and cultures,
and other life forms. 16) Environmental justice calls for the education of
present and future generations which emphasizes social and environmental
issues, based on our experience and an appreciation of our diverse cultural
perspectives. 17) Environmental justice requires that we, as individuals,
make personal and consumer choices to consume as little of Mother Earth's
resources and to produce as little waste as possible; and make the conscious
decision to challenge and reprioritize our lifestyles to insure the health of the
natural world for present and future generations.
[d.

Flattau, supra note 16.
37. See United Church of Christ Commission For Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes and
!W.ce Revisited, An Update of the 1987 Report on the !W.cial and Socioeconomic
Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites (1994) at 14 (quoting
Marianne Lavelle and Marcia Coyle, Unequal protection: the racial divide on
environmental law, NAT. L. J., (Sept. 21, 1993». This update to the 1987 study
36.
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ardous sites "see faster action, better results and stiffer penalties than communities where blacks, Hispanics and other minorities live."38 Thus, not only are these communities overburdened with the hazards, but they are also forced to live with
these hazards for longer periods of time. 39
C.

AIR POLLUTION REGULATION

At the same time the environmental justice movement was
forming, the Federal Clean Air Act regulations also went
through their own transition, as industry protested that the
laws were too rigid and costly. 40 Industry wanted the laws to
focus more on market-based incentive programs which gave
business more control over the mechanisms by which they
would control pollution and reduce operation costs. 41 As evidenced in the environmental justice context, the ensuing
changes in the Clean Air Act regulations marked a conflict between health issues and economic concerns. 42
The Clean Air Act proscribes the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS),43 which consist of primary and

discusses the discrepancy between the fmes levied and the time it takes to dispose of
toxic hazards in white communities versus minority communities. See id.
38. Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: the Need
for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 683 (1992) (quoting Marianne
Lavelle and Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental
Law, NAT'L L. J., (Sept. 21, 1992)). Penalties in white communities affected by
hazardous waste sites average $335,566 in comparison to $55,318 in minority
communities. See id. at 683.
39. See Symposium, Environmental Justice: the Merging of Civil Rights and
Environmental Activism, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 445 (1994). The speaker
refers to the National Law Journal which reports that it "uncovered glaring inequities
in the way the federal EPA enforces its law." Id. at 452.
40. See Stewart, supra note 6, at 153. Stewart discusses what he characterizes as
the "indissoluble conflict between environmental goals ... and economic growth .... "
[d. at 153.
.
41. See infra notes 60·68 and accompanying text for a general discussion of the
market·based incentive program.
42. See generally Stewart, supra note 6. See also infra notes 168-170; 186-189 and
accompanying text for discussion of the conflict between health and cost issues.
43. See generally Clean Air Act of 1970,42 U.S.C.A. § 7408 (West 1995) (amended
1990):
Air quality criteria and control techniques (a) Air pollutant list; publication
and revision by Administrator; issuance of air quality criteria for air
pollutants; (b) Issuance by Administrator of information on air pollution
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secondary ambient air quality standards. 44 The Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator determines
these standards. 45 The Clean Air Act does not make these
standards directly enforceable against the states!6 Rather, it
requires each state to develop a State Implementation Plan
that describes how the state will attain the standards. In fact,
a state may create a State Implementation Plan that is more
stringent than the Clean Air Act's standards. Ultimately, each
State Implementation Plan must meet EPA approval. 47 Once
the EPA approves it, the Plan can be enforced by both state
and federal authorities. 48

control techniques; standing consulting committees for air pollutants;
establishment; and membership; (c) Review, modification, and reissuance of
criteria or information; (d) Publication in Federal Register; availability of
copies for general public; (e) Transportation planning and guidelines; (0
Information regarding processes, procedures, and methods to reduce or control
pollutants in transportation; reduction of mobile source related pollutants;
reduction of impact on public health; (g) Assessment of risks to ecosystems;
and (h) RACTIBACTILAER clearinghouse.

ld.
44. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7409(b) (West 1995) (amended 1990). The Clean Air Act
defines primary ambient air quality standards as those standards "[iJn the judgment of
the EPA Administrator . . . [are) requisite to protect the public health." ld. §
7409(b)(l). The Clean Air Act defines secondary ambient air quality standards as
"requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse affects
associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air." ld. § 7409(b)(2).
45. See id. All further reference to the "Administrator" is to the Federal
Environmental Protection Agency Administrator.
46. See THEODORE L. GARRETT AND SONYA D. WINNER, A CLEAN AIR ACT PRIMER
(The Environmental Law Reporter, Clean Air Deskbook 1992). The purpose of the
Clean Air Act is to give the states general guidelines for developing their own plans.
Once those plans are developed, then they can be enforced against the states. See id.
at 11.
47. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a) (West 1995) (amended 1990).
State implementation plans for national primary and secondary ambient air
quality standards (a) Adoption of plan by State; submission to Administrator;
content of plan; revision; new sources; indirect source review program;
supplemental or intermittent control systems. (1) Each State shall, after
reasonable notice and public hearings, adopt and submit to the Administrator,
within 3 years (or such shorter period as the Administrator may prescribe)
after the promulgation of a national primary ambient air quality standard (or
any revision thereoO under section 7409 ... for any air pollutant, a plan which
provides for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such
primary standard in each air quality control region (or portion thereoO within
such State.
ld. See also GARRETT AND WINNER, supra note 57, at I!.
48. See 42 V.S.C.A. § 7410 (West 1995) (amended 1990).
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State Implementation Plans permit each state to devise and
implement plans that suit its particular area and problems. 49
Each state may incorporate requirements that mirror the more
traditional command and control system which would entail
EPA monitoring the methods states use to attain NAAQS.50
Alternatively, the states have the option to develop marketbased incentive programs in which the states, with the input of
regulated industry, not the EPA, devise the methods for meeting NAAQS requirement. 51

1.

The Command and Control System

The command and control system is a form of air pollution
regulation that "specifies a precise compliance method rather
than simply an emissions level."52 The command and control
system imposes "legally enforceable limits, conditions and affirmative requirements on industrial operations, generally controlling sources that generate pollution on an individual basis."53 Each state must devise and implement a plan that complies with the command measures and control techniques approved by the Administrator.54 These compliance requirements

49. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LAw, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 792 (2d ed. 1996).
50. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410 (West 1995) (amended 1990). States have less
flexibility under the command and control system. See id.
51. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410 (West 1995) (amended 1990). See also infra notes
168-170; 186; 189; and accompanying text for discussion of how the problems arise
when states develop market-based incentive programs that fail to consider public
health issues.
52. See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading An Economic Incentive Program:
Replacing the Command and Control! Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 289, 297 (1998). Despite this perceived difference, Driesen argues that the
traditional command and control system is more similar to the market-based incentive
system than its critics are willing to admit. See id.
53. Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous
Journey From Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 104 (1998). For
example, pollutant air emissions from "each regulated source are liinited to specified
amounts, with the regulated entity further required to install a technology to meet
those limitations and to monitor its emissions continuously.» Id. (construing 42
U.S.C.A. § 7408 (West 1995) (amended 1990».
54. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a)(1) (West 1995) (amended 1990).
These
requirements include specific control techniques and time tables by which to
accomplish the state's plan. See id. § 7410(a)(2)(A-B).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol29/iss3/7

12

Razon: Environmental Law

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

1999]

551

must be met within a specific time period. 55 Each regulated
industry must conform to the Clean Air Act's standards under
the regulatory plan devised by the state in which its operations
are located.56 Some of these standards are "technology-forcing"
because they require industry to implement technological controls regardless of whether such technology yet exists. 57 The
command and control approach also forces regulated companies
to pay identical costs regardless of how much each company
actu~lly contributes to pollution. 58 The traditional command
and control environmental regulations are, however, not the
only method used by states to control emissions in order to
comply with the Clean Air Act. 59

2.

Market-Based Incentive Programs

The Clean Air Act provides for an alternative pollution control method known as the market-based incentives approach. 60
The Clean Air Act included market-based incentives at its inception, but the incentive method has not been utilized to the
extent of the command and control regulations until relatively
recently. 61 The concept behind the market-based incentive approach to pollution control is to provide less expensive alternatives to the command and control system through programs

55. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a)(1) (West 1995) (amended 1990). For example, each
state is required to adopt or submit a plan within three years after the NAAQS are set.
See id.
56. See generally 42 U .S.C.A. § 7410 (West 1995) (amended 1990).
57. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 264 (1976). The Supreme Court
interpreted the "as may be necessary language" of 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410 to permit the
EPA to require industry to develop technology, whether or not it yet exists, to achieve
NAAQS.
Furthermore, the Court found technology-forcing requirements were
consistent with the Clean Air Act's language. See id.
58. See Jeremy B. Hockenstein et aI., Crafting the Next Generation of MarketBased Erwironmental Tools, 39 ENV'T 4, 14 (1997). For example, a company that
contributes five percent to the overall level of pollution pays the same amount to
implement the pollution control measures as a company that contributes seventy-five
percent of the overall pollution. See id.
59. See infra notes 60-80 and accompanying text for discussion of alternatives to
the command and control system.
60. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (West 1995) (amended 1990).
61. See Hockenstein, supra note 58, at 13. Market-based environmental tools
"have been part of the environmental policy landscape (though with varying degrees of
prominence) for the past two decades because they are attractive in both theory and
practice." [d.
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that «provide an economic benefit for pollution reductions and
an economic penalty for pollution. "62 The market-based incentive programs may be directed toward stationary or mobile
sources 63 and are designed to create more flexible, less expensive techniques for emissions reduction. 64 Market-based incentives are designed to reduce emissions without setting specific
limits "that individual sources or even all sources in the aggregate are required to meet. "iI5 In contrast to the command and
control system, the market-based incentive approach does not
specify how industry will attain the NAAQS.66 Rather, the
market-based incentives system provides various economic enticements tailored to the individual companies that, in theory,
will reduce the state's pollution output at a lower cost. 67 Emissions trading is one example of such a market-based incentive
program.66

62. Driesen. supra note 52. at 323. The author outlines the arguments as to why
the market·based incentive system is preferred over the command and control system.
See id.
'
63. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(a)(3) (West 1995) (amended 1990). A stationary source
is dermed as: "any building, structure. facility. or installation which emits or may emit
any air pollutant." Id. Section 7521 catergorizes mobile sources in terms of what they
emit and whether they are light· or heavy-duty vehicles. See id. § 7521.
.
64. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.491 (1997). Market-based incentive programs are defined
as:
[Market-based incentive program] ... means a program which may include
State established emission fees or a system of marketable permits. or a system
of State fees on sale or manufacture of products the use of which contributes to
0 3 [oxide] formation. or any combination of the foregoing or other similar
measures, as well as incentives and requirements to reduce vehicle emissions
and vehicle miles traveled in the area. including any of the transportation
control measure .... Such programs may be directed toward stationary. area,
and/or mobile sources, to achieve emissions reductions milestones, to attain
and maintain ambient air quality standards. and/or to provide more flexible.
lower-cost approaches to meeting environmental goals.

Id.
65. See id.
66. See Daniel J. Dudek and John Palmisano. Emissions Trading: Why is this
Thoroughbred Hobbled? 12 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217 (1988).
67. See Hockenstein, supra note 58, at 15.
68. See Hockenstein. supra note 58, at 14 for further discussion of other EPA
approved programs, such as pollution charges. tradeable permits, reducing market
barriers and elimination of government subsidies.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol29/iss3/7

14

Razon: Environmental Law

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

1999J

3.

553

Emissions Trading

In its 1986 "Emissions Trading Policy Statement," the EPA
provides Clean Air Act and federal regulation compliance
guidelines for industrial emissions trading. 69 The EPA endorses the use of emissions trading and it maintains that
"these alternatives do not alter overall air quality requirements."70 The policy provides companies with alternative
methods of achieving pollution control compliance m accordance with the Clean Air Act requirements. 71
Emissions trading has its own "currency" known as emISsions reduction credits (ERCs).72 Facilities involved in emissions trading earn ERCs, which are stored in "banks." The
various emissions trading programs determine how the ERCs
are created, banked and distributed. 73 Trading ERCs is not
limited to the same facility, nor to the same type of pollution
source. 74 A new pollution source that generates 100 tons ofhydrocarbon emissions "would be obligated to obtain more than
100 tons of emissions reductions in order to obtain a permit to
construct. "75 In order to reach these emission reductions, the

69. See Emissions Trading Policy Statement: General Principles for Creation,
Banking and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814 (1986).
70. [d. EPA seeks to ensure that when facilities attempt to utilize more
economically beneficial techniques, the Clean Air Act requirements will not suffer as a
consequence. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. See also 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, App. X (1998). Emissions trading programs
use either rate-based emission limits or overall emission limits "on a source's total
mass emissions per unit of time" to compel compliance, placing emissions limits on
either individual sources or facilities as a whole. Rate-based emission limits are also
called "emissions averaging" while overall limits are referred to as "an emissions cap,"
or the total emissions limit. Id.
73. See Perry S. Goldschein, Going Mobile: Emissions Trading Gets A Boost From
Mobile Source Emission Reduction Credits, 13 UCLA J. ENVTL. L & POL'Y 225, 229
(1994/1995) (identifies specifics of mobile source emissions reduction credits).
74. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, App. X (1998). "Stationary ... and mobile sources both
can participate in the same emissions trading market." For example, those areas that
have a restricted stationary market in comparison to the constraints placed upon its
mobile sources, benefit by including both stationary and mobile sources in "a single
emissions trading market." Id.
75. Dudek and Palmisano, supra note 66, at 224. In 1975, the EPA grappled with
how to permit new sources of pollutants in areas that have either failed to attain the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) or failed to demonstrate they could
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new source may utilize what is known as the Offset Policy "so
long as overall emission reductions [are] achieved within the
airshed leaving the area better off than before. "76 Under the
Offset Policy, this new source must offset its pollution by trading with an already existing source. 77 These offsets are designed to allow continued industrial growth while ensuring an
overall emissions reductioll, particularly in polluted nonattainment areas where the offset ratios are higher than the new
source actually needs for its planned emissions. 78
The EPA generally views emissions trading as a more flexible method for reducing pollution control costs and reaching
compliance more quickly as opposed to the time-consnming and
bureaucratic command and control system. 79 Nonattainment
regions: such as the Los Angeles region, have reconfIgured
their methods of pollution control to take advantage of the
flexibility and economic efficiency of the emissions trading system.so

meet the NAAQS at a future date. The remedy came in the form of the Offset Policy.
See id.
76. [d. Therefore, these "new emissions would need to be more than 'offset' by
emissions reductions." [d.
77. See PERCIVAL, supra note 49, at 808. The offset policy "envisions ... creating
an emissions trading market, with fIrms that are building new plants or expanding
existing plants purchasing pollution reductions from existing facilities." [d.
78. See Emissions Trading Policy Statement: General Principles for Creation,
Banking and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814 (1986). Industry
will still be allowed to expand even though it may not have met the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards required under its State Implementation Plan. See id. See also
PERCIVAL, supra note 49, at 808. "Emissions trading programs provide fIrms with
flexibility and then with an incentive to take advantage ofthat flexibility, because any
successful trade ends up costing the parties less than implementing a uniform level of
pollution controls .... " [d.
79. See Emissions Trading Policy Statement: General Principles for Creation,
Banking and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814 (1986). See also
Stewart, supra note 6, at 153. The command and control system is criticized for its
bureaucratic centralization, r.Qsts and delay.
Proponents of the market-based
incentives system prefer it to the traditional command and control system because they
believe market-based incentives provide industry with more flexibility in making
pollution control decisions that impact them. Proponents argue that industry is better
qualifIed to make decisions as to the means by which to comply with the NAAQS. See
id.
80. See generally Matthew Polesetsky, Comment, Will A Market in Air Pollution
Clean the Nation's Dirtiest Air? A Study of the South Coast Air Quality Management
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THE SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT

The California Legislature created pollution control districts
to control air pollution at the regional levePI One such district, the South Coast Air Quality Management District
(SCAQMD), implements the air quality requirements for the
Los Angeles metropolitan area, home of the United State's
dirtiest air. 82 The SCAQMD Board of Directors encountered
difficulties complying with its attainment standards and took
steps to convert from a command and control system to a market-based incentive program. 83
The SCAQMD created the Regional Clean Air Incentive
Market (RECLAIM) in 1993.84 Under RECLAIM, SCAQMD
allows polluting industries to earn ERCs or "pollution rights"
by reducing their emissions below overall annual capS.85 Once
a polluter earns pollution rights, it may either preserve those
rights for future use, lower its present emissions caps or it may

District's Regional Clean Air Incentives Market, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 359 (1995). The
South Coast Air Quality Management District developed this program in 1993. See id.
8l. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40410 (West 1996). See also Polesetsky,
supra note 80, at 362-363. EPA created regional districts to allow states to have more
control. See id.
82. See Shipra Bansal and Scott Kuhn, Stopping An Unfair Trade: Environmental
Justice, Pollution Trading, and Cumulative Impacts in Los Angeles, ENVTL L. NEWS,
Spring 1998, at 16, 17. This area includes a 6600-square-mile basin consisting of
Orange, San Bernardino, and Riverside Counties and the non-desert portions of Los
Angeles. See id.
83. See Polesetsky, supra note 80, at 364. The author presents a detailed history
of the development of the SCAQMD's market-based incentives program. See id.
84. See Pat Leyden, The Price of Change: The Market Incentive Revolution, 12
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 160 (1998). In 1991, "[r)epresentatives from the California
Air Resources Board, EPA, large and small businesses, environmental groups, labor
representatives, academia, economists, and the stock and commodities markets went to
work with the AQMD to write a 'constitution'." Id.
85. Regional Air District's Market Approach for Stationary Emissions Upheld by
Court, [Jan.-June) Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1675 (Jan. 2, 1998). See also Do
market-based emissions controls mean the poor breathe the dirtiest air?, CAL. LAw.,
July 1995, at 39. RECLAIM specifically imposes these emissions caps on nitrogen
oxides and sulfur oxides. See id. See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 7409(c); 7473(a) (West 1995)
(amended 1990). These sections discuss nitrogen oxides and sulfur oxides. Both are
criteria pollutants under the Clean Air Act. See id.
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sell the rights to other companies that exceed their emissions
caps. 86
Another method SCAQMD uses to accomplish emission reductions is the use of rules implementing specific programs
designed to aid companies in achieving lower emissions rates. 87
One such rule allows industrial polluters to scrap vehicles as
an emissions reduction method. 88

1.

The Old-Vehicle Scrapping Rule 1610

The Old-Vehicle Scrapping Rule 1610 (Rule 1610) is one of
SCAQMD's mobile source offset programs. 89 Rule 1610 allows
industries to meet their pollution discharge limits by reducing
motor vehicle emissions instead of merely controlling their own
emissions. 90

86. See Regional Air District's Market Approach for Stationary Emissions Upheld
by Court, [Jan.-June] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1675 (Jan. 2, 1998).
87. See id.
88. See Los Angeles, Cal., South Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 1610
(amended Feb. 12, 1999) (visited April 5, 1999) < http://www.aqmd.gov> (on file with
author) [hereinafter SCAQMD Rule 1610]. See also Communities for a Better Env't v.
South Coast Air Quality Dist., Complaint 'lI'lI 12·13 (No. 10R·97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed
July 23, 1997). Industries, especially the major oil companies, use the vehicle
scrapping rule as an alternative to a rule that would require them to place vaporrecovery equipment on their vessels, which would nearly eliminate harmful emissions.
See id.
89. See Los Angeles, Cal., South Coast Air Quality Management District
Regulation XVI Mobile Source Offset Programs (visited Feb. 21, 1999)
<http://www.aqmd.gov/ruleslhtmlltofc16.html > (on file with author). See also ARBEPA Exchange Casts Doubts on Emissions Trading Rules, 11 CAL ENVTL. INSIDER 7
(1998). The Air Resources Board's Executive Officer announced that he has suspended
approval of emissions trading rules, specifically citing Rule 1610 and its environmental
justice implications. See id. See also California: Group [Communities for a Better
Environment] Files Civil Rights Complaint Against Automobile Scrappage Program,
[July-Dec.] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 639 (August I, 1997). The Environmental
Protection Agency decided in March 1997 that Rule 1610 "does not conform with
federal rules for economic incentive measures." Id.
90. See SCAQMD Rule 1610(a). The District divides the various rules into
different regulations categories. For instance, Regulation XI are source specific
standards and Regulation XX represent the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market
regulations. See id. Adopted on January 8, 1993, Rule 1610's goal is to:
reduce motor vehicle volatile organic compounds (VOC), nitrogen oxides
(NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), and particulate matter (PM) exhaust emissions
by issuing mobile source emission reduction credits in exchange for the
scrapping of old, high emitting vehicles. Procurement of old vehicles could be

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol29/iss3/7

18

Razon: Environmental Law

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

1999]

557

To be eligible to use Rule 1610, however, the vehicles must:
be pre-1981 models; be in compliance with smog inspections; be
registered with the California Department of Motor Vehicles
.for the past two years; be adequately mobile so that its owner
can drive it to the "scrappage" facility; and have at least three
years useful remaining life prior to scrapping. 91 Under Rule
1610, a polluter can purchase motor vehicles from the public.
These cars are destroyed and then SCAQMD "translates" them
into smog credits, called Mobile Source Emissions Reductions
Credits (MSERCs), and these MSERCs can be banked or sold
to other polluters. 92 Polluters may not use the MSERCs to offset emission increases that arise when the polluters have either removed the Clean Air Act required emissions controls or
failed to install the requisite controls as required on stationary
sources. 93

accomplished by persons voluntarily giving up their vehicle for scrapping upon
receiving an incentive payment. This rule provides a mechanism through
which stationary source emissions can be brought into compliance with
District regulations through mobile source emission reductions. Mobile source
emissions reduction credits (MSERCs) generated may only be applied towards
compliance with designated rules with future compliance dates within District
Regulation XI, Source Specific Standards; Regulation XXII, On·Road Motor
Vehicle Mitigation; Regulation XIII, New Source Review; Regulation XX,
Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM); or any other District
regulations that allow the use of credits. MSERCs may not be applied towards
compliance with federal requirements that do not authorize compliance
through emissions trading including those promulgated by U.S. EPA as
authorized ... that do not authorize compliance through emissions trading.
The value of these credits is based on old vehicles having at least three years
useful remaining life prior to scrapping. The effective date for Rule 1610
amendments relating to tlie permanent destruction of engine components
approved by the Governing Board on February 12, 1999 shall be March 1,
1999.

Id.
91.

See SCAQMD Rule 1610.

See also South Coast AQMD, 11 CAL. ENVrL.

INSIDER 13 (1998) (describes some of the vehicle eligibility requirements).

92. See SCAQMD Rule 1610. The rule defmes MSERCs as "credit for real,
quantified emission reductions, approved by the Executive Officer or designee, as
authorized by this rule, and surplus to emission reductions required by ARB, District,
and U.S. EPA regulations and the most recent District or U.S. EPA approved Air
Quality Management Plan, whichever is more stringent. " See id. at Rule 1610(b)(1).
93. See id. at Rule 1610(a). Regulation XI does not allow oil companies to
substitute a Clean Air Act requirement, such as Marine Tank Vessel Operations Rule
1142, for a proposed emissions trading program like Rule 1610. See id.
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2.

The Marine Tank Vessel Operations Rule 1142

Another emissions control rule in effect in the Los Angeles
basin is known as the Marine Tank Vessel Operations Rule
1142 (Rule 1142).94 Rule 1142 applies to marine tank vessels 95
engaged in loading, lightering, ballasting, or housekeeping
events in which either the vessel's tank or cargo is filled with
organic liquid 96 Rule 1142 requires marine vessels, such as
those used by oil companies, to install marine vapor recovery
equipment that reduces the amount of harmful vapor emlSsions. 97
When the marine vapor recovery equipment is not used,
volatile organic compounds, such as benzene, are released into

94. See Los Angeles, Cal., South Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 1142
(adopted July 19, 1991) (visited Feb. 21, 1998) <http://www.aqmd.gov> (on file with
author) [hereinafter SCAQMD Rule 11421. Rule 1142 was adopted in 1991 and
approved by the EPA for submission into SCAQMD's State Implementation Plan,
effective January, 1992. See id. at Rule 1142(c)(1)(A).
95. See id. at Rule 1142(b)(11). Marine tank vessels include tugboats, tankers and
watercraft. See id.
96. See id. at Rule 1142(b). Ballasting refers to "the loading of water or other
liquid into a marine tank vessel's cargo tank to obtain proper propeller, rudder and
hull immersion." [d. at Rule 1142(b)(2). Housekeeping refers to the "altering of the
composition of gases contained within marine vessel tanks by tank washing, gas
freeing, or purging." [d. at Rule 1142(b)(7). Lightering means "the transfer of organic
liquid into a cargo tank from one marine tank vessel to another." [d. at Rule
1142(b)(9). Loading means "an incident or occurrence beginning with the connecting of
marine terminal storage tanks or a marine tank vessel to marine tank vessel cargo
tank(s) with pipes or hoses followed by the transfer of liquid cargo and ending with the
disconnecting of the pipes or hoses; or any other means of placing liquid into cargo
tanks." [d. at Rule 1142(b)(10). Organic liquid includes various forms of gasoline,
crude oil and other liquids that contain volatile organic compounds. See id. at Rule
1142(b)(13).
97. See id. at Rule 1142(c)(1)(A). "Effective January 1, 1992, an owner or operator
of a marine tank vessel equipped with emissions control equipment shall operate such
equipment while conducting a loading, lightering, ballasting, or housekeeping event in
South Coast Waters." The emissions control equipment "shall be designed and
operated to collect, store, and process all emissions of volatile organic compounds
resulting from a loading, lightering, ballasting, or housekeeping event." [d. at
1142(c)(3). Furthermore, such events:
shall not be conducted in South Coast waters unless: (i) the emissions of
volatile organic compounds are limited to 5.7 grams per cubic meter (2 lbs. per
1,000 barrels) of liquid loaded into a marine tank vessel; or (ii) the emissions
of volatile organic compounds are reduced by at least 95 percent by weight
from uncontrolled conditions.
Id. at Rule 1142(c)(1)(b)(i -ii).
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the air. 9S The marine vapor recovery process is extremely effective because it reduces toxic chemical vapors by over ninetyfive percent and reduces or eliminates the escape of other
harmful vapors. 99 However, oil companies claim that installing·
the equipment is extremely costly.loo Thus, if they could rely on
another emissions reduction rule, such as Rule 1610, oil companies believe they would be more economically benefited. 101
SCAQMD allowed five oil companies to employ Rule 1610
instead of implementing Rule ·1142. 102 While oil companies who
substitute other emission control rules for Rule 1142 may be
saving money by not installing the marine vapor recovery
equipment, the oil companies do so at the cost of people living
in the San Pedro and Wilmington South Coast Air Basin (air
basin) who breathe the benzene-filled air. loa Latino's comprise

98. See Communities for a Better Env't v. South Coast Air Quality Dist.,
Complaint'll 12 (No. 10R·97·R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23, 1997). See also SCAQMD
Rule 1610(b)(8). Rule 1610 defines volatile organic compounds as "any volatile
compound of carbon, excluding: methane, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, carbonic
acid, metallic carbides or carbonates, ammonium carbonate, and exempt compounds as
defined in District Rule 102." [d.
99. See id.
100. See Memorandum from Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Legal Director,
Communities for a Better Environment (July 18, 1997) (on file with author). The
estimated cost of installing the marine vapor recovery equipment per company would
total approximately $5 Million. See id.
101. See id. The oil companies argue that instead of spending the approximately
$5 Million for the vapor control equipment, they should be allowed to buy MSERCs.
Drury asserts, however, that even though the oil companies would have to pay this
price, the "cost per pound of pollution reduced is actually low in comparison to other
control technologies." [d.
102. See Communities for a Better Env't v. South Coast Air Quality Dist.,
Complaint'll 23-24 (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23, 1997). Communities for a
Better Environment (CBE) also filed civil complaints against individual oil companies
it alleged violated the Clean Air Act. The original Clean Air Act civil complaints
named five oil companies: GATX Corp., Unocal (now owned by Tosco), Tosco, Chevron
and Ultramar. See Communities for a Better Env't v. GATX Terminals Corp.,
Complaint, (No. 98-1282 ER (BQRx)) (C.D. Cal. Filed March 26, 1998) (GATX has a
consent decree settlement; Tosco's complaint was dismissed; and Unocal's complaint
was dismissed without prejudice). See also Communities for a Better Env't v. South
Coast Air Quality Management Dist., Order (No. 98-5877 DT(BQRx)) (C.D. Filed Feb.
I, 1999). Tosco filed a defamation suit CBE based on the original complaint which
alleged that Tosco violated the feder~l and state environmental laws. The court
granted CBE's 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss without prejudice.
103. See Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82, at 17-18.
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a majority of the air basin population. 104 When federally
funded programs, such as SCAQMD's emission control rules,
specifically impact members of a minority group, these programs may violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and its implementing regulations. 105
E.

TITLE VI OF THE CML RIGHTS ACT

Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Title VI) was not designed to operate as a penalty, but rather to ensure that recipients of government funds do not use these funds in a discriminatory manner.106 The Civil Rights Act authorizes each agency
to promulgate regulations that will satisfy the statute's goals. 107
Federal agencies have used Title VI to address the environmental justice concerns raised in the 1983 GAO report and the
President's Executive Order 12,898 by tying money to enVIronmental equality in funded programs. lOS
The EPA administers many fmancial assistance programs
and has created its own implementing regulations that forbid
federal financial assistance recipients, such as SCAQMD, to
use criteria or methods that have discriminatory effects on

104. See Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82, at 16.
105. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, §601, as amended 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West
1994).
106. See id. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act provides that "[nlo person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id. See also Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). The Supreme Court found that despite the absence of
intentional discrimination, non-English speaking Chinese students were disparately
affected when they were denied equal educational benefits. The court interpreted Title
VI to bar practices that had a discriminatory effect, irrespective of whether intentional
discrimination was present. See id. at 568.
107. See Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285, 312 (1995). Litigants are starting to prefer Title
VI over the Equal Protection Clause because Title VI allows suits to be brought when
the complainant can demonstrate discriminatory effects, while the Equal Protection
Clause requires proof of intentional discrimination. See id. at 311.
108. See generally U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL TITLE VI
ENFORCEMENT TO ENSURE NONDISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS 415
(1996). The Commission on Civil Rights took the findings of the GAO Report and
President Clinton's Executive Order on environmental justice very seriously. See id. at
417.
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groups because of race, color, national origin or sex. 109 Actions
taken by recipients of EPA financial assistance, including the
recipient's choice of locating its facilities, are subject to these
requirements. 110 The EPA's environmental justice role is coordinated with the Office of Civil Rights. III
When bringing a Title VI claim, a claimant need not demonstrate intentional discrimination if the claimant is able to provide evidence of a disparate impact on minorities. 112 Hence,
even though a company may not have intended a harmful impact on a minority community, it is still subject to Title VI
claims and violations because a company's intent is irrelevantY3
Because the SCAQMD qualifies as an EPA recipient of federal fmancial assistance, it is subject to Title VI and EPA's corresponding implementing regulations. 114 Therefore, minority
claimants who have complaints against rules implemented by

109. See generally Fisher, supra note 107, at 285. The EPA provides funding for
many state hazardous waste enforcement programs. See id. at 312. See also 40 C.F.R.
§ 7.30 (1997). This statute grants the EPA authority to create its own promulgating
regulations. See id. According to section 7.35(b) a federal financial assistance recipient
can be a local government entity such as the SCAQMD. Furthermore, the recipient
"shall not use criteria or methods ... which have the effect of subjecting individuals to
discrimination ...." [d. at § 7.35(b).
110. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1997).
111. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.120, 7.130(b) (1997). To pursue a Title VI claim, the
complainant must submit a complaint to the Office of Civil Rights (OCR), which will in
tum investigate the claim. During the first twenty days after receipt of the complaint,
OCR will make a decision as to whether to go forward with the complaint. If the OCR
accepts the complaint, it will notify both the complainant and the federal funds
recipient and provide the recipient thirty days to respond, rebut or deny the allegations
in the complaint. Should OCR make a final determination that the recipient is in
noncompliance with Title VI, OCR will begin its procedure to "deny, annul, suspend or
terminate" its financial assistance. In order to reach this determination, OCR will
have sent the recipient various correspondence in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 7.115.
After the recipient has had an opportunity to respond to, rebut or deny the complaint's
claims, OCR will notify the recipient of its preliminary findings and provide it with
recommendations or give it the right to engage in voluntary compliance. OCR will
continue to have contact with the recipient and will only withdraw funds as a last
resort. This process shall be completed within 180 days from the start of the
compliance review or complaint investigation. See id. §§7.120, 7.130(b).
112. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1997).
113. See id.
114. See id. § 7.15.
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SCAQMD may fIle Title VI complaints with the EPA against
SCAQMD, and allege that the SCAQMD rules creatEl a disparate impact on racial minorities. 115
CBE fIled an administrative complaint with the EPA
against the SCAQMD on July 23, 1997. 116 CBE's administrative complaint represents the first time Title VI, EPA's Title VI
implementing regulations and Executive Order 12,898 have
been used to challenge the distributional consequences of emissions trading. 117
III.

DISCUSSION

By fIling its complaint, Communities for a Better Environment (CBE) sought to stop oil companies from using the OldVehicle Scrapping Rule 1610 (Rule 1610) in lieu of the Marine
Tank Vessel Operations Rule 1142 (Rule 1142).118 CBE contended that Rule 1610 was illus~rative of the problems with
emissions trading programs and that these programs ignored
cumulative environmental impacts and environmental justice
concerns. 119 Instead of employing Rule 1142, which would have
captured nearly ninety-five percent of the harmful vapors in
the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD),
CBE stated that the companies used Rule 1610 as a "loophole"
for cost efficiency. 120

On July 23, 1997, on behalf of minorities living in the San
Pedro and Wilmington South Coast Air Basin (air basin), CBE

115. See 42 V.S.C.A. § 200Od-1 (West 1994).
116. See Challenges Filed To Implementation of SCAQMD Scrapping llule, 11 CAL.
ENVTL. INSIDER 5 (1997). Communities for a Better Environment (CBE) is a non-profit
organization that litigates environmental and environmental justice issues. CBE filed
the complaint along with Los Angeles Communidades Asambladas Vnidas para un
Sostenible Ambiente, CBE's community organizing project.
117. See Memorand um from Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Legal Director,
Communities for a Better Environment (July 18, 1997) (on file with author).
118. See Communities for a Better Env't. v. South Coast Air Quality Management
Dist., Complaint'll 2 (No. 10R-97-R9) (V.S. EPA filed July 23, 1997). CBE's major
'concern is the grave environmental justice impact on the minority communities in the
South Coast Air Quality Management District. See generally id.
119. See id. at '11'11 1-3.
120. See id. See also notes 100-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of costs
to install the vapor recovery equipment.
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fIled an administrative complaint with the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). 121
This complaint alleged that
SCAQMD and the California Air Resources Board (CARB) violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Title VI), EPA's Title VI implementing regulations and Executive Order 12,898. 122
CBE's 'goal was to force the oil companies to comply with
SCAQMD Rule 1142.123 CBE also fIled Clean Air Act civil complaints against each of the oil companies who did not install the
marine vapor recovery equipment, alleging their actions violated the Clean Air Act. 124
A.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT

In its complaint, CBE alleged that SCAQMD and CARBI25
violated Title VI by allowing the oil companies to misuse the
emissions trading Rule 1610 which in turn created a disparate
impact on the surrounding minority community.l26 In addition,

121. See Communities for a Better Env't. v. South Coast Air Quality Management
Dist., Complaint (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23,1997).
122. See id. at 'lI 1.
123. See Memorandum from Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Legal Director,
Communities for a Better Environment (July 18, 1997).
124. See Communities for a Better Env't v. GATX Terminals Corp., Complaint (No.
98·1282 ER (BQRx» (C.D. Cal. Filed July 23, 1997); Communities for a Better Env't v.
Unocal, Complaint (C.D. Cal. Filed July 23, 1997); Communities for a Better Env't v.
Tosco, Complaint (No. 98-5877 DT(BQRx» (C.D. Cal. Filed July 23, 1997);
Communities for a Better Env't v. Chevron, Complaint (No. 98-5173 DT (BQRx» (C.D.
Cal. Filed July 23, 1997); Communities for a Better Env't v. Ultramar, Complaint (No.
98-5174 DT (BQRx» (C.D. Cal. Filed July 23, 1997).
125. See Communities for a Better Env't. v. South Coast Air Quality Management
Dist., Complaint'll 13 (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23, 1997). The complaint
names both the South Coast Air Quality Management District and the California Air
Resources Board (CARB). CARB is the state agency that works with both the U.S. and
California EPA to approve environmental emissions control programs. See id.
126. See generally Communities for a Better Env't. v. South Coast Air Quality
Management Dist., Complaint (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA flied July 23, 1997). CBE
filed this administrative complaint with the EPA with hopes that the EPA would also
find that the SCAQMD violated Title VI. See id. See also Letter from David P.
Howekamp, Director, Air Division, United States Environmental Protection Agency, to
Barry Wallerstein, Executive Officer, South Coast Air Quality Management District,
(February 10, 1999) (on file with author). In this letter, Mr. Howekamp's comments
regarding SCAQMD Rule 1610 references the May 1997 version of the rule, but he also
states that the February 1999 version of SCAQMD Rule 1610 still does not address all
of EPA's concerns and therefore would also not be approved. See id. EPA's concerns
are that: 1) SCAQMD Rule 1610, May 1997 version, does not "lead to old car emissions
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by allowing the oil companies to use Rule 1610, SCAQMD ignored the pleas for environmental justice. 127
SCAQMD's application of Rule 1610 creates a disparate impact on the Latinos who live and work in the affected area and
also contributes to an uneven distribution of harmful vapors in
the air basin. l28 CBE requests that the EPA prohibit SCAQMD
from operating the Rule 1610 program and if SCAQMD refuses, then CBE requests the EPA to withdraw its fmancial
assistance from the SCAQMD. I29
B.

CLEAN AIR ACT SUITS AGAINST THE OIL COMPANIES

On July 23, 1997, CBE also fIled civil suits against five oil
companies it considered responsible for releasing harmful volatile organic compounds into the air basin in violation of the
Clean Air Act.130 The named oil companies used Rule 1610 as

being taken out of the air"; 2) SCAQMD Rule 1610, May 1997 and February 1999
versions, still "allow the use of credits generated in the past through the lise of engine
sanding at facilities for compliance with federal requirements such as new source
review (NSR) offsets '" and reductions necessary to demonstrate attainment of and
progress towards the national ambient air quality standard for ozone"; and 3)
SCAQMD Rule 1610, May 1997 and February 1999 versions, do not address that "Rule
1610 does not require a careful examination of how the program is operating and
whether cleaner air results from its implementation." [d. Furthermore, EPA notes
that it is currently reviewing the market-based incentive progr~m policy to address
environmental justice. When these revisions are complete, "EPA expects that
[SCAQMD) Rule 1610 will need to incorporate those [environmental justice) elements.
[However, the EPA) would not cite [environmental justice) issuers) as a reason for
disapproving Rule 1610 until [EPA's) policy has been revised." [d. .
127. See generally Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82.
128. See Communities for a Better Env't v. South Coast Air Quality Management
Dist., Complaint 'J[ 2 (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23, 1997). See also Smog
and Health, Health Effects Studies, (visited Feb. 21, 1999) <http://www.aqmd.gov> (on
file with author) [hereinafter Smog and Health). Smog and Health reports from a 1991
study, conducted by Dr. Jane Hall of Cal State Fullerton, that minorities as a whole
were "exposed more often to poor air quality since they tend to live in more polluted air
where housing is affordable. African Americans and Hispanics ... [also) tend to work
in outdoor occupations." [d.
129. See Communities for a Better Env't v. South Coast Air Quality Management
Dist., Complaint 'J[ 1 (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23,1997).
130. See Communities for a Better Env't v. GATX Terminals Corp., Complaint (No.
98-1282 ER (BQRx)) (C.D. Cal. Filed July 23, 1997); Communities for a Better Env't v.
Unocal, Complaint (C.D. Cal. Filed July 23, 1997); Communities for a Better Env't v.
Tosco, Complaint (No. 98-5877 DT(BQRx)) (C.D. Cal. Filed July 23, 1997);
Communities for a Better Env't v. Chevron, Complaint (No. 98-5173 DT (BQRx)) (C.D.
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an alternative to the perceived more costly Rule 1142, which
required them to install vapor control equipment used during
tanker loadings. 131 CBE asserted that by trading Mobile Source
Emissions Reduction Credits (MSERCs) in this manner, the oil
companies violated the Clean Air Act requirements. 132 By using Rule 1610 in lieu of Rule 1142, the oil companies contributed to negative cumulative impacts on air quality in the air
basin. l33 Although the aggregate level of air pollution in the
Los Angeles area was reduced, because Rule 1142 was not employed in the air basin, the people who live and work in that
area were still subjected to harmful vapors. 134
Despite the success of the marine vapor control equipment
in other regions, and the harm caused by failure to use this
method, the oil companies continued to claim that their use of
Rule 1610 contributed to the reduction of emissions in the entire Los Angeles region in a more economical fashion. l35 By
using Rule 1610, they claimed they contributed to the reduction of emissions in the entire Los Angeles region. 136
C.

STATUS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL COMPLAINTS

Currently, the Title VI Complaint is still under investigation by the EPA 137 This investigation, however, has prompted

Cal. Filed July 23, 1997); Communities for a Better Env't v. Ultramar, Complaint (No.
98·5174 DT (BQRx)) (C.D. Cal. Filed July 23, 1997).
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See Communities for a Better Env't. v. South Coast Air Quality Management
Dist., Complaint'll 2 (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23, 1997). When small
regions of an air district are subjected to harmful vapors while the rest of the region
becomes cleaner, such an area is known as a "toxic hotspot. n [d. at 'II 17.
134. See Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82, at 17.
135. See Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82, at 17-18. See also Memorandum from
Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Legal Director, Communities for a Better Environment (July
18, 1997) (on file with author). For example, by relying on Rule 1610, the oil companies
spent $4.4 million total as opposed to the $5 million it would cost to install the marine
vapor recovery equipment. See id.
136. See Communities for a Better Env't. v. South Coast Air Quality Management
Dist., Complaint 'l1'li21-24 (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23,1997).
137. See Letter from David P. Howekamp, Director, Air Division, United States
Environmental Protection Agency, to Barry Wallerstein, Executive Officer, South Coast
Air Quality Management District, (February 10, 1999) (on file with author).
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EPA review of both Rules 1610 and 1142.138 With respect to the
Clean Air Act civil complaints, of the five originally named oil
companies: GATX Corp. has signed a consent decree; the complaint against Unocal (now owned by Tosco) was dismissed
without prejudice; the complaint against Tosco was dismissed;
and the complaints against Chevron and Ultramar are still
pending. 139
IV.

CRITIQUE

As both of the Communities for a Better Environment
(CBE) complaints illustrate, the oil companies' and the South
Coast Air Quality Management District's (SCAQMD) behavior
has further exasperated this struggle for environmental justice. 140 While the aggregate Los Angeles area may have a reduction in vehicle emissions due to the implementation of the
Old-Vehicle Scrapping Rule 1610 (Rule 1610), the overall
harmful emissions in the San Pedro and Wilmington South
Coast Air Basin (air basin) have not been reduced. 141 In fact,
the SCAQMD's decision to allow the oil companies to use Rule
1610 in lieu of the Marine Tank Vessel Operations Rule 1142
(Rule 1142) has had the effect of concentrating harmful emissions in the air basin. 142 As a result, the primarily Latino
community in the air basin suffers disproportionate harm in
comparison with other communities throughout the
SCAQMD.I43 Because of the environmental justice problems

138. See id.
139. See Communities for a Better Env't v. GATX Terminals Corp., Joint
Stipulation on Consent Decree, (No. 98·1282 ER (BQRx)) (C.D. Cal. Filed March 26,
1998).
140. See Challenges Filed to Implementation of SCAQMD Scrapping Rule, 11 CAL.
ENVTL. INSIDER 5 (1997).
141. Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82, at 18. In taking older, high·emitting
vehicles off the road, the oil companies contribute to cleaning up the air in the entire
SCAQMD. However, the oil companies purchased the mobile source emission
reduction credits, instead of installing the equipment. Thus, the primarily Latino
population in the air basin felt and continues to feel the harmful effects. See id.
142. See Communities for a Better Env't v. South Coast Air Quality Dist.,
Complaint '11'11 18·26 (No. 10R·97·R9) (U.S. EPA fIled July 23,1997).
143. See id. at 22.
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created by this policy, SCAQMD's decisions need reevaluation.I44

A
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND TITLE VI IMPLICATIONS OF
RULE 1610
If the oil companies had installed the vapor emissions control equipment as required under Rule 1142, they would have
prevented most, if not all, of the harmful vapors from dispersing into the air. I45 Instead, the Latino community in the air
basin continues to be subjected to a toxic environment.146 If the
oil companies still desire to simultaneously accumulate Mobile
Source Emission Reduction Credits (MSERCs) to engage in
permissible emissions trades, they could do so by making sure
that their trades reduce emissions throughout the Los Angeles
area, including the air basin. I47 Hence, the oil companies could
have reduced the severe impacts on the neighboring communities and still have engaged in emissions trading. 148
B.
THE BROADER E'NVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF RULE
1610

Rule 1610's primary environmental consequences stem from
its initial implementation. 149 The industrial polluters who
144. See generally Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82.
145. Communities for a Better Env't v. South Coast Air Quality Dist., Complaint 'lI
13 (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23, 1997).
146. See id. at 'lI 10 (quoting Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in
Environmental Law, NAT'L L. J., Sept 21, 1992). The National Law Journal article
discusses the inequities minorities face with regard to EPA's enforcement of these
groups' environmental rights. See id.
147. See generally id.
148. See Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82, at 18-20. Thus, the severe impacts on
the Latino community in the air basin could have been avoided. See id. See also Smog
and Health, Health Effects Studies, (visited Feb. 21, 1999) <http://www.aqmd.gov> (on
file with author). The impact includes increased cancer rates of workers and residents
in the polluted region. See id.
149. See generally South Coast AQMD, 11 CAL. ENVfL. INSIDER 13 (1998). This
article lists some proposed solutions to address the problems with SCAQMD Rule 1610.
Some of the proposed solutions include:
a visual and functional inspection of the vehicle by the scrapper when an
owner volunteers it for scrapping. The staff proposal outlines a number of
requirements that the scrapper must verify, including that the doors are
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qualify under and participate in the emissions trading program
undermine the goals of Rule 1610 by violating its requirements. l50 In addition, the ''vehicle scrappers" often fail to completely destroy the vehicles and instead dismantle the vehicles
for spare parts. 151 Further, SCAQMD has also overestimated
the value of the MSERCs, as the vehicle owner probably would
have taken the car out of circulation despite the program. 152
With such evidence, SCAQMD should recognize these inherent
problems and address them so that the goals of the program
will be attained. 153
C.

INCOMPATffiIUTY OF RULE 1610 AND RULE 1142

In addition to the problems associated with its implementation, Rule 1610's plain language does not permit oil companies
to use Rule 1610 in lieu of Rule 1142}54 Rather, MSERCs may
be used only to comply with Rule 1142 to the extent that they
are not used to offset emissions increases resulting from either
removal of or noncompliance with emissions control equipment. l55 SCAQMD's policy does just that: it allows the oil com-

present, that the windshield wipers work, that all pedals are present and
operational, that bumpers are present and functional, etc. The scrapper must
put the vehicle through a driver test that demonstrates that it is in good
working condition. Criteria that the vehicle must meet during the test are
specified. There are provisions for retesting a vehicle that initially fails the
test.
1d.

150.

See CBE Sues SCAQMD Over Amendments to Car Scrapping Rule, 12 CAL.

ENVTL. INSIDER 10 (1998). For instance, SCAQMD Rule 1610 requires the cars to have

at least three years of useful life left in them, yet more often than not, the car barely
works enough to make it to the scrapper. See id.
151. See id. A SCAQMD inspector noted that a car engine obtained from a
scrapped Volkswagen was resold for use in another car, thereby defeating the purpose
of scrapping the car. See id.
152. See South Coast AQMD, 11 CAL. ENVTL. INSIDER 13 (1998). Thus, the car
owner probably would have removed the car anyway because of new insurance
requirements or "natural attrition.» 1d.
153. See id.
154. See supra note 90 for discussion of SCAQMD Rule 1610's purpose.
155. See Los Angeles, Cal., South Coost Air Quality Management District Rule
1610(a) (amended Feb. 12, 1999) (visited April 5, 1999) <http://www.aqmd.gov> (on me
with author) [hereinafter SCAQMD Rule 1610). The SCAQMD Regulation XI sets
forth these specific trade requirements so that such trades will actually decrease
emissions. See id.
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panies to trade MSERCs instead of installing the vapor recovery equipment. In addition, the Clean Air Act requires
SCAQMD to enforce Rule 1142, as it is already part of its State
Implementation Plan, while Rule 1610 has not been approved
by the EPA I56 Thus, SCAQMD's choice not to enforce Rule
1142, while simultaneously implementing Rule 1610, is contrary to the requirements of the Clean Air Act.
Furthermore, the use of MSERCs to offset mobile source
emissions limitations is questionable, as source offsets traditionally refer only to stationary sources to ensure actual emissions reductions. 157 The inherently different natures of marine
tank vessels, as stationary sources, and motor vehicles, as mobile sources, result in disparate effects from their emissions. 158
Thus, the use of Rule 1610 by the oil companies allows incompatible trades. I59
In addition, removing high-emitting cars from the pollution
source pool, rather than installing the marine vapor recovery
equipment, the oil companies claim that the entire region benefits. Given the mobile nature of cars, the reduction of vehicle
emissions has a cumulative impact in the Los Angeles region as
a whole. Iso However, three of the marine terminal sites are 10-

156. See Challenges Filed to Implementation of SCAQMD Scrapping Rule, 11 CAL.
ENVTL. INSIDER 13 (1997). See also Letter from David P. Howekamp, Director, Air
Division, United States Environmental Protection Agency, to Barry Wallerstein,
Executive Officer, South Coast Air Quality Management District, (February 10, 1999)
(on file with author). As of April 5, 1999, the EPA still had not approved Rule 1610.
See id.
157. See David M. Driesen, Trade as a Technique, Not a Religion, at 6·7, presented
at Air Management Advisory Committee Stationary Source Subcommittee New York
State Department of Environmental Conservation (Jan. 5, 1993) (on file with author).
In his presentation, Driesen argued that "Congress did not intend to authorize offsets
from mobile sources or the use of credits outside the regulated source toward
[Reasonably Available Control Technology) compliance when it amended the Act in
1990." Furthermore, he argued that if Congress had intended to allow mobile source
reductions to be used in this manner, it would have "raised the offset ratios, since the
scarcity of offsets would diminish." Id.
158. See Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82, at 18·20.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 17. Cumulative impact refers to the overall effect on air quality. See
id.
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cated in the predominantly Latino air basin. 161 Thus, while
reducing pollution in the Los Angeles region, the harmful emissions from the oil companies' activities remain concentrated in
the air basin. 162 Therefore, the alleged success of the use of
Rule 1610 in lieu of Rule 1142 is deceptive because the oil companies can claim they contribute to the aggregate decrease of
harmful emissions in the Los Angeles area, yet the real harm
caused by their operating in the air basin where they have
failed to make reductions persists. 163
Furthermore, the pollutants reduced from mobile source
emissions are not equivalent to the stationary source emissions
because cars primarily emit carbon monoxide whereas the marine vessels emit volatile organic compounds, such as benzene.
Thus, SCAQMD too contributes to the cumulative impact of
emissions pollution in the air basin by allowing the oil companies to operate in this manner.

v.

PROPOSAL

Environmental justice advocates attempt to ensure that minority communities do not continue to be unfairly laden with
environmental hazards. l64 At the same time, industry regulated under the Clean Air Act will attempt to comply with the
Act in the most economical manner.l65 To protect the interests
of both of these two competing ideologies, the market-based
incentive programs, such as emissions trading, must be monitored. l66 Additionally, environmental justice concerns must be
addressed at the forefront of emissions trading program decisions. 167

161. See id. at 18. Thus, the Latino community is subjected to the toxic vapors.
See id.
162. See id. at 18-19.
163. See generally Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82.
164. See generally Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82. CBE is one example of an
environmental justice advocate. See id.
165. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of why industry
views the market-based incentive programs as more economically efficient.
166. See Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82, at 21-22.
167. See id. at 21.
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EMISSIONS TRADES MUST BE MORE CLOSELY MONITORED

Industry must recognize that emissions trading and Command and control regulations can actually work together. l68 Oil
companies weighed only the economic savings of not installing
the vapor control equipment, rather than considering the compatibility of the trades in which they engaged. 169 In order to
ensure that industry will act responsibly and ethically, industry trades should be extensively monitored by groups outside
the polluting industry. 170
Also, as demonstrated with the Old-Vehicle Scrapping Rule
1610 (Rule 1610), the emissions trading programs do not always work as designed.171 Thus, the trades must be more
closely monitored, by groups like Communities for a Better Environment (CBE), to prevent the creation of future toxic hotspots. 172
B.

ALL INTERESTED PARTIES SHOULD BE CONSULTED

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) states
that, aside from such market considerations, other issues must
be considered such as enforcement issues and public acceptance. 173 Having primarily consulted with business interests
instead of environmental or other public interest groups, the
South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) insured that no voices of dissent or alternative suggestions would

168. See Driesen, supra note 52, at 311.
169. See Memorandum from Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Legal Director,
Communities for a Better Environment (July 18, 1997) (on file with author). The oil
companies were more concerned about the money they saved by not installing the
$5,000,000 marine vapor recovery equipment. Thus, the oil companies saved only
approximately $600,000. See id. See also supra notes 100·10l.
170. See SCAQMD Chair Unveils Environmental Justice Initiatives, 11 CAL.
ENVTL. INSIDER 9 (1997). Approximately a month and a half after CBE challenged the
SCAQMD's practices, SCAQMD's chair came up with a plan to prevent further
environmental injustice. See id.
171. See South Coast AQMD, 12 CAL. ENVfL. INSIDER 18 (1998).
172. See Challenges Filed to Implementation of SCAQMD Scrapping Rule, 11 CAL.
ENVTL. INSIDER 5 (1997). See also supra notes 150-153 and accompanying text for
evidence of Rule 1610's ineffectiveness.
173. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, App. X (1998).
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stall or dispose of the proposed program. 174 SCAQMD should
have consulted a diverse group of parties before haVJing implemented the rule. 175
With the advice of such groups, SCAQMD officials could
better monitor emissions trading techniques at their inception
to ensure that each emission trade is viable and that it does not
result in discriminatory effects in certain regions. 176 In order to
have an effective program, SCAQMD must be certain that the
program achieves pollution control and is properly implemented. 177 Finally, new methods, such as Rule 1610, must be
more closely evaluated before implementation, because a trading program will not be effective unless it actually decreases
pollution. 178
C.
EMISSIONS TRADES SHOULD BE ALLOWED ONLY WHEN
THEY COMPLY WITH THE CLEAN AIR ACT

If industry wants to purchase emissions credits under Rule
1610 to reduce emissions in other parts of the Los Angeles region, industry should be allowed to do so only if its local emissions are at an emissions level that comply with the Clean Air
Act. 179 Rule 1610 states that Mobile Source Emission Reduc-

174. See Challenges Filed to Implerrumtation of SCAQMD Scrapping Rule, 11 CAL.
ENVTL. INSIDER 5 (1997). Environmental groups are disconcerted by what they see as
an "aggressively pro-business, anti-environmental" District Governing Board who
makes the decisions as to how such programs will be implemented. Id.
175. Id.
176. See South Coast AQMD, 12 CAL. ENVTL. INSIDER 18 (1998). As a matter of
fact, the SCAQMD Board called a meeting to devise methods for best ensuring the
future success of such programs. See id.
177. See CBE Sues SCAQMD Over Amendments to Car Scrapping Rule, 12 CAL.
ENVTL. INSIDER 10 (1998).
178. See David M. Driesen, Trade as a Technique, Not a &ligion, at 1 presented at
Air Management Advisory Committee Stationary Source Subcommittee New York
State Department of Environmental Conservation (Jan. 5, 1993). In order to ensure
the system works, it needs to be properly measured. See id. at 1.
179. See Driesen, supra note 52, at 310. Driesen states that:
[ilf a buyer of pollution credits produces emissions with strong local health
effects, for example, cancer-causing hazardous air pollutants, and is distant
from the seUer of credits, then ethical considerations may preclude allowing
the buyer to avoid making reductions at her own plant, even if she purchases
an equal quantity of emissions reduction elsewhere.
Id.
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tion Credits (MSERCs) "may not be [used] toward[ ] compliance
with federal requirements that do not authorize compliance
through emissions trading" and the MSERCs value is determined by the vehicle having at least three years useful remaining life prior to scrapping.l80 By forcing the oil companies
to use Rule 1610 only if their use actually decreases emissions
everywhere, SCAQMD could begin to decrease the exceSSive
emissions in the air basin. 181
In addition, the demand made by environmental justice advocates, that oil companies comply with the Marine Tank. Vessel Operations Rule 1142 (Rule 1142), is not unreasonable and
can also serve the companies' best interests. 182 Regions including the San Francisco Bay Area, Louisiana and New Jersey
have successfully installed such equipment. 183

D.

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MUST BE FACTORED INTO
EMISSIONS TRADING

In its "Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans," the EPA discussed marketbased incentive programs and provided general implementation guidelines while considering the different challenges faced
by each district. l84 SCAQMD ignored the EPA requirements

180. Los Angeles, Cal., South Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 16IO(a)
(amended Feb. 12, 1999) (visited April 5, 1999) < http://www.aqmd.gov > (on file with
author).
181. See Communities for a Better Env't v. South Coast Air Quality Dist.,
Complaint'll 2 (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23, 1997). The oil companies'
previous use of Rule 1610 did nothing to reduce the harmful vapors in the air basin; if
they were forced to make such trades only when the emissions will actually be reduced,
SCAQMD will be one step closer to cleaning up the air basin. See id.
182. See Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82, at 17. The equipment has safety
incentives such as reducing the risk of fires and explosions. See id.
183. See Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82, at 17 and fn 18. The article describes a
study done by the Bay Area Air Quality Management District which "concluded that
vapor recovery systems 'would have a beneficial impact on tanker safety .... A risk
analysis done for an oil company ... indicates that controlling these vapors may
improve safety by as much as eight orders of magnitudes (sic) (100,000,000).'" [d. at n.
18.
184. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, App. X (1998):
The [market-based) [i)ncentive [p)rograms are comprised of several elements
that, in combination with each other, must insure that the fundamental
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that market-based incentive programs meet standards of· accountability, enforceability and noninterference with other requirements of the Clean Air Act. 1ss Consequently, as alleged in
the CBE Title VI administrative complaint, the result is that
another minority community is burdened with toxic hazards,
the very harm that environmental justice advocates have been
working so hard to cease. 186
The goals of the environmental justice movement and those
of a market-based system are often in direct conflict. 187 Businesses want the flexibility to meet their pollution control requirements at the lowest cost possible, while environmental
justice advocates want to decrease, or eliminate entirely, the
harmful effects of pollution on minorities. l88 To lessen the conflict between the two, SCAQMD should push forward with its
environmental justice initiatives and the EPA, along with the
SCAQMD, should ensure that economic goals are not preferred
at the expense of environmental justice concerns. 189

principles of any regulatory program (including accountability, enforceability
and noninterference with other requirements of the Act) are met .... Also it is
important to emphasize that the effectiveness of an [market-based] incentive
program is dependent upon the particular area in which it is implemented. No
two areas face the same air quality circumstances and, therefore, effective
strategies and programs will differ among areas.
Id. The EPA further qualifies its statements in the Appendix and states "[b)ecause
of these considerations, the EPA is not speciJYjng one particular design or type of
strategy as acceptable for any given EIP ...." Id. Thus, the examples given are
general in nature to avoid limiting a state's innovation in developing programs
tailored to individual State needs. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id. These goals must be met "in terms of the costs that the design imposes
upon market transactions and the impact of those costs on market efficiency." Id.
Furthermore, the EPA contends that in designing emissions trading programs, states
should evaluate the programs to ensure environmental goals will be met, yet EPA
makes no mention of health cost considerations. The EPA should include health cost
considerations and balance them with their economic goals. See id.
187. See Challenges Filed to Implementation of SCAQMD Scrapping Rule, 11 CAL.
ENVfL. INSIDER 5 (1997). These struggles are a direct result of the conflicts between
environmental justice and pollution trading programs. See id.
188. See Communities for a Better Env't v. South Coast Air Quality Dist.,
Complaint (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23, 1997).
189. See SCAQMD Unveils Environmental Justice Initiatives, 11 CAL. ENVfL.
INSIDER 9 (1997).
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FUTURE PROGRESS

Because of CBE's complaint, the EPA, SCAQMD and the
California Air Resources Board have been alerted to the environmentaljustice issues raised by SCAQMD's use of Rule 1610
in lieu of Rule 1142.190 In fact, since the filing of both the Clean
Air Act and Title VI complaints, SCAQMD has attempted to
address these environmental justice concerns. 191 SCAQMD's
new chairman asked his staff to investigate several initiatives
to combat the perception that the SCAQMD has been insensitive to environmental justice considerations. l92 This program
highlights environmental justice advocates' concerns, including
problems that have arisen with the oil companies' failure to
follow Rule 1142. 193
Regardless of the outcome of the pending CBE suits, CBE's
complaints have already made an impact, as seen in
SCAQMD's recent efforts. l94 While SCAQMD's environmental
justice. initiatives are still in their initial stages, SCAQMD's
efforts are one step toward achieving the balance between economic and environmental justice interests. 195 The success of
the initiatives will be tested when environmental justice advo-

190. See id.
191. See SCAQMD Unveils Environmental Justice Initiatives, 11 CAL. ENVTL.
INSIDER 9 (1997). These initiatives include:
Irle-examing AQMD toxics rules to see if they need to be toughened and
expanded; creating rapid deployment community response teams to
immediately investigate community emergencies related to airborne
emissions, starting with concerns in the San Pedro area about port activities;
creating incentives to clean up or remove diesel engines in the region ... said
to disproportionately impact low-income communities; reorganizing the
AQMD's environmental impact reports to comment on projects which may
create community air pollution and toxic concerns to help cities in their landuse decision-making; launching a series of town hall meetings through the
AQMD's four-county jurisdiction to increase residents' access and participation
in the development of air pollution control programs; and convening a task
force to investigate local environmental justice concerns, starting with
concerns about disproportionate risks related to emissions credits trading
programs, such as those expressed recently by Communities for a Better
Environment over emissions trading by port oil loading operations.
Id.
192. See id.
193. See generally Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82. See also supra note 191.
194. See SCAQMD Unveils Environmental Justice Initiatives, 11 CAL. ENVTL.
INSIDER 9 (1997).
195. See id.
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cates witness SCAQMD's response to polluters who want to use
emissions trading rules in the future in ways that have disproportionate impacts on minority communities.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although the environmental justice movement has developed slowly; environmental justice concerns now command
more attention. l96 The movement still has a long way to go,
especially in light of the increasing use of market-based systems that are not designed to consider effects on people. 197 To
remove all sources of hazardous emissions and all hazardous
waste sites from every minority community is no doubt impractical. However, at a minimum, companies should make concessions for health and welfare over simply minimizing costs. 198
Unless the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the
South Coast Air Quality Management District factor both economic and environmental justice implications into its rules,
market-based incentives, like emissions trading, should not be
used at all. l99 Realistically, powerful groups like the Regulatory Flexibility Group, who lobbied for the Old-Vehicle Scrapping Rule 1610, will not permit the full-scale elimination of
emissions trading. Industry, however, must be required to
weigh the disproportionate impacts of these programs against
their economic benefits.2OO In addition, in many cases this balance is best maintained through the current command and control system framework. 201
The current scheme of emissions trading essentially allows
industry to buy the right to pollute. 202 Viewing pollution trad-

196. See id.
197. See PERCIVAL, supra note 49, at 190. The authors assert that it is easier to see
who bears the costs of regulations, than who bears the burden of the problems. See id.
198. See id. Regulated targets have an incentive to exaggerate costs of complying
with proposed regulations since industry does not want to comply with the control
measures, such as installing the marine vapor recovery equipment. See id.
199. See generally Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82. The authors also view
pollution trading as allowing the right to pollute and they assert that they Ufirmly
believe that no one should be able to 'buy' the right to pollute." [d. at 20.
200. See id. at 17.
201. See Driesen, supra note 52, at 311.
202. See Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 199.
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ing programs in this light means that industry must merely
factor the cost of pollution into its overall production costS. 203 If
companies need only factor in economic pollution penalties,
environmental justice issues lose force since social consequences are disguised when pollution credits are bought and
sold.204 When companies are allowed to operate in this manner,
environmental justice problems will continue and government
and business response will remain reactive, notproactive. 205
While the current Title VI lawsuit spurred the South Coast
Air Quality Management District to create environmental justice initiatives and the California Air Resources Board to suspend approving credit rules, the future is unclear.206 Only if
environmental justice advocates, affected communities and
polluters are all involved in the process can the public be sure
that environmental justice goals will move closer to realization.

Rachel Brasso Razon •

203. See id.
204. See id. at 20. The authors quote Michael Sandel who sees the purchasing of
pollution rights as turning pollution into "a commodity to be bought imd sold,
remov[ing) the social stigma that is properly associated with pollution." Id.
205. See United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes and
Race Revisited, An Update of the 1987 Report on the Racial and Socioeconomic
Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites (1994) at 14 (quoting
Marianne Lavelle and Marcia Coyle, Unequal protection: the racial divide on
environmental law, NAT. L. J., (Sept. 21, 1993)). Despite the increased awareness of
environmental justice issues, this updated study shows that the placement of toxic
waste sites in minority communities has increased. Therefore, one step toward
decreasing this phenomenon is to prevent siting toxic waste sites in these communities,
instead of dealing with the effects afterward. See id.
206. See ARB to Suspend Approval of Credit Rules, 11 CAL. ENVTL. INSIDER 4
(1997).
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